

U. S. GROUP CONTROL COUNCIL
(Germany)
APO 742
Office of Director of Intelligence

0185752

Not indexedNot to be made

IN SS 371.1-102

30 July 1945

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

IF FOLDER

128

IF FOLDER

128

SUBJECT: GERMANY, Amt VI Collaboration with the Japanese.

1. The report quoted below is forwarded for information:-

"XIII. Amt VI collaboration with the Japanese.

42. The officers of Amt VI dealing with Japan were:

Professor Dr. CLASSEN

Dr. KIRFEL

Dr. LEO

Dr. WEIRAUCH (til the end
1944)and a number of other experts whose names SCHELLENBERG
has forgotten.

Mil. Amt officers dealing with Japan were:

Colonel OHLETZ

Two naval officers whose names SCHELLENBERG does not
remember.Captain PLAGE, who ran an office in Berlin (travel
bureau or something similar) under the cover of
which the daily exchange of intelligence took
place with the Japanese officers.Several other experts, whose names SCHELLENBERG is
not familiar with collaborated in this domain.

Dr. WIRSING was another collaborator of Amt VI with the Japanese
Intelligence Service. He worked on the political side of central
intelligence regarding Japan whilst Lt. Colonel FREUND, together
with an officer whose name SCHELLENBERG has forgotten, covered the
field of counter espionage.

43. The names of Japanese officers prominent in the collab-
oration between the Japanese Intelligence Service and SCHELLENBERG'S
Amt are as follows:-

OSHIMA

KAWAHARA - first Counsellor at the Japanese Embassy, an
impenetrable and difficult man who was the real political observer
representing Tokyo.

KOMITSU - Major General and Military Attache, typical
army officer who dealt with everything in a crude and military
way and was blindly devoted to OSHIMA. KOMITSU'S assistants were:-

a) OTANI. He had a good command of Russian and was
the expert for Russia. An able intelligence officer
and in SCHELLENBERG'S view one of the best the
Japanese had in Germany.

b) Lt. Colonel HIGUTI. A Samurai-type, very serious

DO NOT DESTROY OR MUTILATE

RECORD COPY

Do NOT Destroy Return to the
NSA Technical Library when no longer needed

C-2464

T-1111

worked a great deal with Poles and Ukrainians. He sought close contact with SCHELLENBERG and even called on him in his office. SCHELLENBERG always switched him over to FREUND whom HIGUTI knew well, or to OHLETZ. HIGUTI collaborated closely with NAMBIAR. NAMBIAR was SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE's lieutenant in Germany. He was very intelligent, knew the Indian question thoroughly and had lived four years in Moscow. SCHELLENBERG thinks that there was more behind him than was outwardly visible.

- c) NISHI, He was as far as SCHELLENBERG remembers, KOMATSU's third assistant. He played, it seems, a particularly important role.

Admiral KOJIMA - Naval Attache. He was from 1934 (?) until 1937 or 1938 assistant Naval Attache and returned again to Germany in 1944. He was in SCHELLENBERG's opinion the most active and also the most capable Japanese in Berlin. He possessed a great knowledge of the personalities amongst the German leaders and knew many details regarding the most intimate happenings. He had good collaborators, but must have also had in SCHELLENBERG's view, well informed German "Zutraeger" and agents. SCHELLENBERG says it was terrifying to what extent German counter espionage against the Japanese seemed completely disinterested. It was always argued that Japan was a good ally.

Admiral ABE - He was chief of the Japanese military mission within the terms of the three power pact. SCHELLENBERG describes him as an old trained intelligence officer. He spent many years in U.S.A., has studied there and acquired a great deal of knowledge in manifold domains. He is regarded by SCHELLENBERG as cold blooded and cunning, a 100% Japanese who looks down, at least on German life, in a superior and slightly ironical manner. His functions were of particular importance amongst the Japanese military representatives and he was obviously tacitly recognized by all as the 'senior chief'.

"44. With the Japanese there were frequently arranged official and unofficial parties. In general the Japanese were tremendous drinkers (especially OSHIMA and KOMATSU, but also the others. The exceptions were in most cases the most intelligent ones and those who really did the work). The Japanese were represented in Berlin in great numbers. One evening at a party given by HIMMLER in the summer of 1944, there were present not less than seventeen high Japanese officers. This was only a 'small' delegation. In the course of this evening SCHELLENBERG had an interesting conversation with ABE who constantly returned to the subject of South America and the possibility of German-Japanese collaboration there. SCHELLENBERG left this question completely open. The counter question of HITLER regarding Japanese work in the U.S.A. on the other hand found no response with ABE. In the discussion that followed, ABE showed particularly good knowledge regarding the U.S.A. (Touching the negro question, he remarked that negroes were not suited for intelligence or sabotage work, the same applied to the Japanese who emigrated to the U.S.A.).

"45. As a result of this party at HIMMLER's, SCHELLENBERG asked HIMMLER to pick for him from the Wehrmacht and the SS, ten to fifteen young and keen officers who could after a short general training and without being charged with intelligence tasks, proceed to Japan in order to get acquainted with the country, its inhabitants and its language. SCHELLENBERG's request was refused. When some time later ten young naval officers were at last supposed to be going to Japan, Seekriegsleitung and DOENITZ did not, however, allow them to receive a short political training from the experts of SCHELLENBERG's A t VI.

"46. KOJIMA, so SCHELLENBERG says, recognised very clearly these

Admiral MEISEL sees only his U-boats and has no other problems. KOJIMA knew very well all the deficiencies of the German leadership. He had no use whatsoever for RIBBENTROP. One day in January or February 1945, KOJIMA, confiding himself to SCHELLENBERG, said: The whole German state machinery, also the military leadership of the Reich are over-organized; in separate sections everything works very well and in an exemplary way. What is lacking, however, is the right combination of the whole. Hitler has concentrated everything on himself. This will not do. He needs a Reich General Staff and a Reich Cabinet. Co-operation with Japan has not been realized either in the political, the military or even the economic field in the manner in which a war like this makes it imperative. RIBBENTROP, KOJIMA said, confuses foreign policy with propaganda. His (KOJIMA's) main object after his return to Germany had been to bring about a compromised peace between Germany and Russia. Behind him had stood the opinion of the Japanese navy which regarded a block, Germany-Russia-Japan, as a desirable goal.

"47. Japan had even been prepared to give up parts of Manchukuo and other territories and to bring about a complete change in the policy vis China. KOJIMA said it had taken a long time before he had convinced OSHIMA of the necessity for such lines of thought, as OSHIMA had been a devoted follower of Hitler's ideas. RIBBENTROP and Hitler had shown completely wrong reactions and had transferred the centre of gravity of entirely superficial soundings to Tokio and Ambassador STEINER who as a result of the questions which he was asked to put officially to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, had given a wrong direction to the whole course of events. KOJIMA said now everything was too late and he regretted sincerely that he had to wait to February 1945 to speak with SCHELLENBERG in this way. He thought that if he had found the line to SCHELLENBERG in 1944 things would have gone better. The same applied also to the intelligence connection between SAKAI and EGGEN.

"48. According to SCHELLENBERG, SAKAI was an obviously specially picked intelligence officer working with KOJIMA. He was in contact with EGGEN. The latter worked with SAKAI on an economic basis. As far as SCHELLENBERG remembers he founded a firm for which the Japanese had to find the money. Apart from the tendency to put thereby his financial position in order (EGGEN had, it seems, lost a great deal of money in Hungary and France), he achieved good relations based on confidence with SAKAI. This man must have had contacts with the Russians or must have known ways to approach them. It was planned that EGGEN should together with SAKAI, meet a Russian spokesman in Bern at IKAMOTO's house. This meeting did not, however, take place as OKAMOTO fell gravely ill (it was alleged that he had a heart attack). SCHELLENBERG remembers EGGEN telling him that the Russian in question was a professor at one of the Swiss Universities (Zurich?). His name was something like ORLOWSKI (?). EGGEN always pretended that the Japanese, therefore mainly SAKAI AND KOJIMA, wanted to win over SCHELLENBERG for co-operation with the Russians. KOJIMA referred to disagreements between the Army and Navy in Japan. The Navy wanted a quick termination of the war in China and a moderate, peaceful and purely Asiatic co-operation with China as well as a close alliance with Russia, which in KOJIMA's view was quite natural because Russia needed in the Pacific a naval power tuned in with Russian policy. KOJIMA firmly believed in his thesis. He was therefore also of the opinion that it was essential that a more intelligent and more flexible Japanese Ambassador should be dispatched to Moscow. He maintained that MATSUOKO was too old for his job. He also said that the Japanese army always wanted to show off and for this reason prolonged the war in China.

"49. This difference of views was also perceptible between KOMATSU and KOJIMA. They kept from each other their visits to SCHELLENBERG. KOJIMA spoke to SCHELLENBERG in April 1945 quite openly of a three days 'secret' visit of ONODERA in Berlin. He (KOJIMA) had assumed that KO-

SCHELLENBERG asked about ONODERA and wanted to know if he had had a good time in Berlin. When KOMATSU last called on SCHELLENBERG he asked again for closest collaboration and offered at the behest of the Japanese General Staff that all Japanese Military Attaches abroad should assume contact with SCHELLENBERG's representatives and should co-operate also in the domain of W/T. This offer was, however, never put into practice. KOMATSU had asked for exact details concerning the preparation of underground work and of guerilla warfare. He said that the intention was to start these things in Japan earlier than in Germany.

"50. In order to characterize the existing situation, SCHELLENBERG told the following episode: At a dinner party in OSHIMA's house (apart from HIGUCHI only political members of the mission were present) the consumption of alcohol was immense. Two men fell for each other, OSHIMA and KULTENBRUNNER. At the end both of them made endless speeches. HAWA-HIRA and a very intelligent Japanese Legation counsellor who was very different from the rest, were reserved and were not happy about the trend of the evening. Another Legation Counsellor of a pronounced Mongolian type, sat down near SCHELLENBERG in an ostentatious manner and pointed out to SCHELLENBERG that it was not right of him not to drink alcohol (SCHELLENBERG is a confirmed teetotaler and non-smoker). The Japanese added that the other Germans made good for SCHELLENBERG's deficiency. The Japanese then drank very quickly two or three glasses of whiskey and asked SCHELLENBERG if it was correct that his policy tended always towards England and why he had no weak spot for Russia instead. SCHELLENBERG replied that he himself had not asked the Japanese for his attitude towards Russia. Thereupon the Japanese rose and poured a whole glass of whiskey over SCHELLENBERG's face. SCHELLENBERG says that it was a very painful situation for him. Other Japanese ceased the culprit and dragged him out of the room by his ears and hair. SCHELLENBERG later asked about the man; he was the expert in the Japanese Embassy on Russia.

"51. SCHELLENBERG maintains that the Japanese Sections of Amt VI and Mil. Amt worked in reality against Japan. The Kommando Meldgebeit China worked foremost against Russia and Japan. WEIRAUCH was for a long time working together with Dr. LEO in the Japanese Section and maintained numerous connections with Japanese as well as with Germans who know Japan. WEIRAUCH was however mentally not up to his job. He was therefore transferred to political intelligence work. As far as SCHELLENBERG remembers he was working from Hungary against Russia. Dr. KIFFEL had passed a Japanese language exam. He was destined to proceed to Japan by submarine for the purpose of studying the country. Ultimately he was dispatched as a liaison officer with and for observation of the Japanese evacuated from Berlin to Kitzbuehl as far as SCHELLENBERG knows.

"52. Intelligence co-operation abroad between the Geheime Meldedienst and Japanese Intelligence officers did not exist according to SCHELLENBERG. As far as he knows there existed especially good contacts between:

MOYCZISCH in Ankara and a young Japanese (Baron AOKI). They had agreed to pool their W/T service in the event of a possible rupture of diplomatic relations on the part of Turkey with any one of their countries. This arrangement did not, however, take practical shape.

KRAEMER in Stockholm with ONODERA.

MEISSNER in Bern with OKAMOTO. OKAMOTO according to SCHELLENBERG must have had at his disposal an 'immense amount' of foreign exchange. He tried twice to bribe MEISSNER with huge sums.

"54. In Japan itself the Geheime Meldedienst had no strong representation. The so-called Police attache, Police Colonel MEISINGER, had no qualifications whatsoever for his job (he was formerly the expert on homosexuality, Jewish property and kindred subjects) and received his job only because he had to be given a lucrative position. He was in close touch with MUELLER. They often spoke on the telephone to each other and needed no telephone code both speaking the same broad Munich dialect unintelligible to outsiders. MEISINGER's only importance to SCHELLENBERG was that he maintained at the same time the connection with a younger man of Amt VI in Tokio (Dr. COHMEN or KOHMEN?) and also with HUBER in Shanghai as well as a third man (name forgotten) in Bangkok. MEISINGER was able to send the reports of these men and of their intelligence contacts by diplomatic W/T to Berlin. In 1943 a new chief of the Auslands Organization Japan proceeded to Japan. His name was SPAHN and he had been trained by VI. C. As far as SCHELLENBERG remembers he worked very little for Amt VI. He does not know to what extent he was useful to the A.O. Towards the end it was planned to send KIRFEL together with the new Military Attache, Major General KESSLER, to Japan. Owing to the heavy cargo which the three submarines in view were carrying (they had the engineers for the V-weapons on board and apart from that it was said also "fighting orders" Kampfauftrage - an 'idea fixe' of DOERNITZ and MEISEL - which meant guns, torpedoes etc. to attack enemy shipping on the way to Japan), this idea could not be realized. It was then arranged that KESSLER should work as far as he found it possible for Mil.C. He had been put into the picture by OHLETZ and his officers. Two of the engineers had been as far as SCHELLENBERG knows, roped in for Amt VI work by Dr. WAPP.

For the Director of Intelligence

Richard Collins, Jr.
RICHARD COLLINS, JR.

Colonel, FA

Chief, Special Sections Branch.

DISTRIBUTION:-

A. C. of S, G-2, War Department
D.H.I., War Office
D.N.I., Admiralty
C.N.O., Navy Department
A.C.C.S. (I), Air Ministry for A.I. 3 (d)
S.W.P. Allied Air Force I.L.C., Air Ministry c/o A.I. (1)
A.C.C.S. (I), ANCMF
Intelligence Officer, COMNAVEU
Intelligence Officer, COMNAVFOR GERMANY
Intelligence Officer, COMNAVTECHMISEU
Director of Intelligence, USSEAF
A. C. of S, G-2, AFHQ
Japanese Intelligence Section, USFET
Intelligence Branch:-

DI
DDI
Chief, SS Branch
Documents Section
Economic Section

Authority NWJ 32 823